doi 10.4067/S0718-83582012000300002

Norms, Sense of Community and Neighborhood Collectivism in a High-rise Setting¹

Yung Yau²

² Associate Professor Department of Public and Social Administration City University of Hong Kong Hong Kong SAR. People’s Republic of China.

Abstract

Residents’ willingness to intervene is a crucial determinant of the livability of their neighborhoods. In high-rise cities, the ownership arrangements of most private housing necessitate collectivism among residents in many neighborhood affairs. Mancur Olson’s seminal free-rider theorem suggests unless being profitable for every single participant, collective action will neither be initiated nor sustained. In real life, however, many residents in high-rise neighborhoods do actively engage in collective actions, which call for an explanation for this observed deviation from the theoretical prediction. With an aim to understand why some residents are willing to participate and others are not, this study analyses the findings from a structured survey on private housing residents in Hong Kong. While the collective interest model serves as a theoretical starting point for this study of resident participation in neighborhood affairs, particular foci are put on the importance of norms and sense of community on neighborhood collectivism. Given the recurrent nature of the realization of public goods for a neighborhood (e.g., environmental cleanliness and public safety), residents are thought to participate in repetitive ‘games of collective action’. As suggested by some game theorists, social norms play an important role in shaping collective behavior of individuals, particularly in repeated games. The analysis results indicate that apart from the oft-cited selective benefits and costs, social norms and sense of community are important determinants of neighborhood collectivism in high-rise housing in Hong Kong. The research findings bear far-reaching policy and practical implications about the housing and neighborhood governance in many high-rise cities.

KEYWORDS: COLLECTIVE ACTION; COLLECTIVE INTEREST MODEL; NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNANCE; SENSE OF COMMUNITY; SOCIAL NORMS.

Introduction

Proper upkeep of housing is conducive to the achievement of urban sustainability of all cities in the world in many different ways. First, it delays demolition of housing structures because housing has a longer economic life upon timely repair and routine maintenance³. Besides, it safeguards occupants’ health and safety by ensuring the livability of the residential environment⁴, and helps preserve asset value for the owners⁵. In spite of its significance, proper housing upkeep is not automatic. Mismanagement and disrepair are commonly seen problems in private housing⁶,⁷,⁸ These problems are particularly serious in multi-owned housing (MOH) in which owners are jointly responsible for the management of communal parts of the properties⁹,¹⁰. For the purpose of this study, MOH refers to residential properties with co-owned elements, including but not limited to apartments, condominiums, cooperative housing and common interest developments.

For proper upkeep of MOH, active participation of residents is always necessary but managing communal parts of housing is, by nature, a typical kind of collective action. Investigations of resident participation in housing management abound in the literature¹¹,¹²,¹³,¹⁴ but most of the previous studies focused on the justifications for or benefits of engaging residents in the management or governance process. Only few have attempted to address residents’ decision making regarding participation. On account of its collective-action nature, MOH management is prone to free-rider problem. While economic theories suggest that rational individuals will try to shirk contributing to the provisions of collective goods, not all residents are non-participative in neighborhood affairs in reality. Therefore, it is interesting to study the decision calculus of the residents of private high-rise MOH in participating in housing management affairs, and identify the determinants of resident participation behavior. Particular foci are placed on the impacts of two social factors, namely norms and sense of community. Some studies suggested that social norms can help explain participation behavior of residents¹⁵,¹⁶. Meanwhile, sense of community was found to catalytically mobilize residents to participate in neighborhood activities¹⁷. However, the impacts of these two factors on resident participation in housing management in a high-rise setting have yet to be explored.

Hong Kong serves as a good laboratory for this study because of the popularity of high-rise residential buildings in the city. Moreover, housing management participation in the city is virtually voluntary for the absence of legislation requiring the compulsory formation of resident association or forcing residents to participate. Although only one city is investigated in this study, the research findings can provide some insights into resident participation in other places with a growing number of co-owned or common interest housing developments, particularly in those mega-rise cities in Asia (e.g., Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo) and Latin America (e.g., Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo).

This paper first reviews the collective-action dilemma in MOH management and its solutions. It is then followed by an overview of private housing management in Hong Kong. Next is the development of analytical framework of this study, followed by the research methodology. A description of the data and the analysis results follow. The implications of the research findings will then be discussed. Lastly, the paper is concluded, together with an agenda for further research.

Decision calculus of resident participation in MOH management

Unlike single-family houses, high-rise MOH is difficult to manage because it consists of both private and public spheres. In the private sphere, individual homeowners have an exclusive right to use and occupy their own dwelling units. On the other hand, the public sphere embraces the common (or communal parts) of MOH, such as entrance lobbies, access corridors, staircases, lifts, service ducts and water pumps. All individual homeowners in a MOH development co-own these common elements, and jointly shoulder the management and maintenance responsibilities associated with them. In other words, the co-owners are socially, legally and financially interdependent with respect to the use, management and upkeep of the common areas and facilities within the MOH development¹⁸. While the management business in MOH can be left up to the professional property managers in most cases, participation of residents is still necessary¹⁹,²⁰,²¹. In particular, when there is a strong-agent-weak-principal problem in which a property manager (i.e., the agent) is empowered to look after the properties for the residents (i.e., the principals) but the former acts for his own benefits rather than the interests of the latter²², the residents have to stand up for their own benefits. With an eye to the creation and maintenance of desirable living conditions, for the present and for the future, residents in MOH must actively and directly involve themselves in their residential communities.

Dilemma of collectivism in housing management participation

Collective actions including the management of MOH are characterized as the voluntary provisions of public goods²³ In spite of the tangible and intangible benefits of proper housing management (e.g., cleaner and safer living environment, lower crime rate and higher asset value), a resident’s participation (or willingness to participate) is often restrained by time and financial constraints²⁴. It is because housing management participation is labor-intensive. Collective action often requires the mobilization of time but time is finite and time contribution can never be physically removed from each individual resident (i.e., one individual’s participation takes his and not other’s time) ²⁵ Therefore, there is a true limit to how much time a person can spend on collective actions. That explains why time is commonly taken as the ultimate resource for a collective action.

In fact, a more complete explanation of resident non-participation can be offered by the rational choice theory which posits that the benefits to the participating residents from the marginal effect of his participative effort for producing a public good are outweighed by the costs of participation²⁶,²⁷. If the residents perceive that the benefits derived from their participation cannot cover the associated costs (e.g., time cost), it would be irrational for them to waste time participating in housing management affairs. In other words, non-action or non-participation is a rational choice if the personal total benefit derived from taking action is perceived to be less than the personal total cost of making the effort.

On account of the characteristics of "non-excludability", "non-rivalry" and "jointness of supply" of public goods, however, collective action is always confronted by the free-rider problem²⁸,²⁹,³⁰. Many outcomes of proper management of MOH are, by nature, public goods. For example, it is almost impossible for a resident to exclude his neighbors in an apartment building from enjoying the clean and hygienic communal areas. The dilemma of collection action predicts that a rational resident seeking to maximize utility or wealth is likely to free-ride his neighbors’ efforts, and others will act in the same way. All residents will behave opportunistically, and there is no cooperation among them. Eventually, no public good is realized³¹,³²,³³.

One of the approaches to initiate collective actions is the use of selective incentive which is essentially benefit that a participant can derive only from his participation irrespective of whether he manages to provide any public goods in the end³⁴. In the case of MOH management, selective incentive can take various forms such as rewards (e.g., honorariums for participants) and punishments (e.g., social sanctions against non-participants). Nevertheless, selective incentive is far from a perfect solution to the collective-action dilemma because it can only result in marginal or short-term instable cooperation³⁵,³⁶. On the other hand, Olson has taken an over-pessimistic view towards the spontaneousness of collective action because of his assumption that rational individuals tend to regard the contribution of their own participation to the provision of a public good as negligible. As a matter of fact, participation of rational individuals in collective actions is often driven by collective interest which is a combination of individual demands for the public good and perceptions of self and group efficacy in the collective provision of the good³⁷,³⁸. Put differently, apart from personal costs and benefits, perceptions about how an individual and a group influence the collective outcomes also matter in the decision-making process.

Norms and collective actions

Apart from rational choice theory, collective action can be explained by sociological theories like the normative conformity model. Individuals are often motivated to contribute to collective goods because of moral obligations or social norms³⁹. Social norms are characteristically standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs about how an individual ought to behave in a given situation and motives that are not outcome-oriented⁴⁰. They can be acquired through social learning, imitation, and pressures from conformity and against deviation. Two types of social norms are relevant to collective actions, namely "norm of fairness" and "everyday Kantianism"⁴¹. The former motivates one to participate given the cooperation by a substantial number of others. The latter, on the other hand, disregards the actions of others. An individual chooses to participate if he thinks universal co-operation is better for everyone than universal defection.

Compliance with Kantian norms depends on individual group members’ belief that such norms are indispensible for the proper functioning of the group, rather than on coercion or instrumental calculation of costs and benefits. Therefore, people typically conform their behaviors to the norms because they have internalized them as right and proper, not because they fear punishment for violating them⁴²,⁴³. Norms of fairness, however, play a more significant role in "repetitive games" and they rely more on the social sanctions (e.g., shame and ostracism) to ensure cooperation. In fact, many MOH management affairs resemble repetitive games. For instance, residents can choose to (or not to) attend or participate in recurrent events like resident meetings and clean-up days. Therefore, social norms should be pivotal in the residents’ participation calculus. When norms are integrated in a rationalistic decision-making process, residents may choose to participate because their non-participation will attract punishments in subsequent games⁴⁴. Moreover, residents are sanctioned or rejected socially if they do not exercise their duties as a responsible resident, i.e., if they do not actively participate in the management of their housing.

While explanations in terms of social norms are often seen as a cultural or structural alternative to rationalistic models, they are not totally independent of cost-benefit analysis⁴⁵,⁴⁶. For example, an individual may refrain from acting morally if the cost of action is prohibitively high. Besides, one takes action with a view to a norm when his action confers benefits upon other members of a group even at a cost to the actor. From above, no incongruity in the incorporation of social norms as variables in the CIM is envisaged.

Sense of community and collective actions

Irrespective of the conformity to social norms, collective action is likely to occur when members of the group are geographically close, have low turnover of membership and share a common interest⁴⁷,⁴⁸. In MOH, a relatively large number of residents live close together within a small physical area so they have a high chance to come across each other⁴⁹ Besides, a safe, clean and pleasant living environment tends to be a common want of the residents. In this regard, a community exists among the residents who share common interests and common identification, and communitarianism can be a driving force for resident participation in housing management. Sense of community, which is essentially "a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group and a shared faith that members needs will be met through their commitment to be together"⁵⁰, can facilitate a group of residents to work together ⁵¹. There has been a proven link between sense of community and neighborhood group efficacy⁵². It has also been evidenced that sense of community had catalytic effects to stimulate voluntary collective actions like participation in a block association⁵³,⁵⁴.

Overview of MOH management in Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, nearly all MOH developments are held in co-ownership. Under this ownership arrangement, individual unit or flat owners are "tenants-in-common" jointly holding the whole development concerned with each other⁵⁵,⁵⁶. Put differently, rather than actually "owning" their flats, flat owners possess undivided shares of the whole development, including the land on which the development was built. The title deeds confer them exclusive rights to occupy and use their flats. At the same time, the responsibilities to manage and maintain the development’s common parts (e.g., entrance lobby, corridors, staircases, lifts and drainage stacks) have to be shared by all co-owners. In most cases, management and control of these common parts in a multi-owned development are governed by a deed of mutual covenant (DMC) which is a land covenant containing terms that bind all co-owners of the development⁵⁷,⁵⁸. In case of accidents or injuries associated with the common parts of the development, all co-owners are jointly and severally liable.

Given the shared ownership of the development’s common parts, consents and cooperation of all the co-owners are prerequisites for the management of these communal elements. Unfortunately, negotiation and coordination among co-owners inevitably necessitate huge resource inputs. To facilitate daily housing management, the co-owners can appoint an external property management agent (PMA) to manage the development on their behalf. Regardless of the appointment of PMA, the co-owners can form an owners’ corporation (OC) within their development. The OC is an independent body set up to act legally on behalf of all co-owners of a multi-owned development. Backed by the DMC and Building Management Ordinance, an OC helps individual co-owners manage common parts of their development, safeguard their interests and resolve neighbor disputes. It is also empowered to enforce resolutions reached in general owner meetings. More importantly, the OC has the statutory power to appoint, terminate and monitor the service provided by a PMA.

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, resident participation in housing management is purely voluntary in Hong Kong. In other words, residents can choose to participate or not in housing management according to their own will. Previous studies report that homeowners in Hong Kong’s private housing do not participate in housing management actively⁵⁹,⁶⁰. Even worse, around 7,000 out of 40,000 private buildings in the city have neither an external PMA nor resident association in any form.⁶¹

Analytical framework of collectivism in MOH management in Hong Kong

An overview of the collective interest model

To study resident participation in the management of high-rise MOH, an empirical study is carried out in Hong Kong’s private apartments using the collective interest model (CIM), which was developed upon Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action⁶². The CIM is chosen because it embraces personal costs and benefits, and collective interest together. The CIM is a decision calculus model for public good provision in the presence of free-riding⁶³. Besides, the high empirical testability is also a definite advantage of the CIM. More importantly, the CIM can incorporate factors such as conformity to social norms and sense of community, which are the foci of this study, into the empirical model. Theoretically, the CIM posits that rational individuals choose to participate in a collective venture when the expected value of their participation exceeds the expected value of their non-participation⁶⁴. The expected value of a collective action is calculated by a rational individual based on the following five factors:

(1) perceived values of public goods provided by a successful collective action (V);

(2) increase in the probability of success if the individual participates (pⁱ);

(3) extent to which the action of the group as a whole is likely to be successful (p^g);

(4) selective costs of participation of the individual (C); and

(5) selective benefits of participation of the individual (B).

Mathematically,

EV (Participation) = (V×p^g×pⁱ) – C + B (Equatim 1)

The CIM conjectures that a rational individual’s decision regarding participation in a collective action hinges on his selective incentives (i.e., selective benefits minus selective costs) and a set of collective interest variables ⁶⁵. The collective interest variables include the perceived value of the public good concerned and self efficacy of the individual and collective efficacy of the group in providing the public good. Self efficacy refers to the belief that one is competent to understand and participate effectively, and influence the collective outcomes. Group efficacy denotes the belief that the group can successfully achieve the desired collective outcomes. The incorporation of these collective interest variables into the CIM suggests that the participation of a single individual can only marginally increase the chance of realizing a public good, and group unity is necessary for success. This premise forms the basis for the logic of free-riding in the CIM such that the individual’s expected value of collective action is conditional on the behavior of other group members. In view of its edges, the CIM has been widely applied to explain different types of collectivism such as mass political activities⁶⁶,⁶⁷ and environmental activism⁶⁸,⁶⁹,⁷⁰.

Model specification and variable definitions for the empirical study

Nonetheless, the CIM is still rather new in housing research. Not many attempts in employing the model to empirically explain residents’ behavior in housing management participation have been made⁷¹,⁷². In this study, the applicability of the CIM to housing management collectivism is tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. In spite of its multiplicative structure as indicated in Equation (1), the CIM is converted into a simple linear additive specification (i.e., first-degree dependent variable taken as a function of the summation of all first-degree independent variables). This conversion is well supported because other functional forms like log-log specification (i.e., logarithm of dependent variable taken as a function of the summation of logarithms of all independent variables) cannot offer empirical qualities superior to those of linear additive specification ⁷³. Besides, the results of an analysis using a log-log specification are sensitive to measurement scales and rescaling. In this regard, the CIM in Equation (1) is adapted into:

EV (Participation) = V + p^g + pⁱ – C + B. (equatim 2)

To aid data collection, the variables in Equation (2) are further broken down or transformed into operationalized factors which are listed in Table 1. The rational choice theory infers that a rational individual will choose to participate in housing management if the expected value of his participation is positive, and the level of participation increases with the expected value. Since EV(Participation) is not easily observable, participation level is taken as the dependent variable for the analysis. A five-point scale (5=very frequently; 4=often; 3=sometimes; 2=seldom; 1=never) is used to gauge a resident’s participation level in four types of management activities, namely, a) attending resident association meetings; b) expressing views at resident association meetings; c) voting at resident association meetings; and d) organizing resident activities. The overall level of participation, PART, is taken as the arithmetic mean of the points received in these four aspects.

The value of the collective good perceived by a resident, V, is measured indirectly with his degree of dissatisfaction with six aspects of housing management outcomes, namely environmental hygiene, fire safety, structural safety, services upkeep, security, and nuisance control. The discontent levels are assessed in the questionnaire using a five-point scale (with 1=very satisfied and 5=very dissatisfied). DISC is calculated as the average of the six discontent scores (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.792). Given that better management standard of housing is a collective good in housing management; residents who are more aggrieved about the situation in which they live in will hold a greater perceived value of the collective good. The participation and discontent levels should thus be positively correlated.

Table 1: Operationalized factors for the empirical analysis.

Group efficacy, P^g, which measures the probability that a group of residents will succeed in providing the collective good is measured by two factors. The first one is expected reciprocity, EXRE. It is evaluated using a five-point Likert scale (with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) on the statement "other residents in your residential development will participate in housing management as you do". The second factor is sense of community, SOC. To gauge this factor, the views of a resident to the statements "my neighbors and I want the same things from the residential development", "I can recognize most of the residents in my residential development", "I feel at home in my residential development", "if there is a problem in my residential development, residents can get it solved", and "residents in my residential development generally get along well with each other" are again measured on a five-point Likert scale (with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree). These five statements are adopted from the Sense of Community Index ⁷⁴, and an overall rating for SOC will be arrived by averaging the five ratings given to the statements (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.892). In view of the collectivism of housing management, an individual may feel that no collective good will be realized in the absence of consonant views and actions by all (or at least the majority of) the residents. It is hence hypothesized that residents with higher levels of expected reciprocity and sense of community are more participative in housing management.

Self efficacy, Pⁱ, is proxied by the perceived personal influence on the management outcome, INFL. The latter refers to an individual resident’s belief that his participation in housing management will increase the probability that the group will achieve the collective good. The degree to which the resident agrees that his participation in housing management is likely to make a difference in the quality of his living place is measured with a five-point Likert scale (with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree). Residents with greater perceived personal influence on the management outcome are expected to be more participative in housing management affairs.

While time is generally regarded the ultimate costs for one to participate in a collective action ⁷⁵, an individual’s ability to pay the selective costs of participation, C, is also determined by the availability of the money, knowledge and skills necessary for his effective participation ⁷⁶. In this light, C is proxied by four demographic variables in the operationalized model. MALE is the dummy variable, which equals 1 for males and zero if otherwise. AGE is a six-category scale for the resident’s age (1=18-24 years old; 2=25-34 years old; 3=35-44 years old; 4=45-54 years old; 5=55-64 years old; 6=65 years old or above). EDU is a six-category scale for the resident’s highest education level attained (1=primary school or below; 2=lower secondary school; 3=upper secondary school; 4=matriculation; 5=sub-degree post-secondary education; 6=degree or above). INC is a six-category measure of the resident’s average monthly income (1=below HK$10,000; 2=HK$10,000-14,999; 3=HK$15,000-19,999; 4=HK$20,000-24,999; 5=HK$25,000-29,999; 6=HK$30,000 or above) ⁷⁷.

Four variables are used to estimate selective benefits, B. The first variable is residential attachment, RATT, which is referred to the affective link that residents establish with their residential neighborhoods where they have a propensity to remain and where they feel comfortable and safe ⁷⁸. Residential attachment is one’s feeling of pride about his neighborhood and identification with its physical aspects ⁷⁹. It can be nourished by the daily encounters with the living environment and neighbors ⁸⁰ In this regard, through participation in various housing management affairs, residents can express and reinforce their feelings of attachment to the neighborhood. In general, participation is encouraged when people feel that they are attached to a neighborhood and that they identify with it ⁸¹. For the measurement of residential attachment, a resident is asked to indicate his agreement, using a five-point Likert scale (with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree) with the statement "you are proud of being a resident in your residential development". The second proxy of selective benefits is committee membership (MEM), a dummy variable which equals 1 for a committee member of a resident association and zero if otherwise. In general, people strive for and benefit from positive social identities associated with their membership groups ⁸². Besides, a resident can gain and express his identity as a committee member of a resident association through active participation in housing management. It is, therefore, expected that participation is more frequent when a resident perceives a stronger residential attachment and is a committee member of a resident association within his housing development.

What come next are two norm-related variables, namely norms of fairness, NOF, and everyday Kantianism, KAN. As discussed earlier, unwillingness to conform may attract social sanctions (e.g., social rejection). That means norm conformity is expected to bring selective benefits to the conformers. To evaluate the two variables, a resident is asked two respective questions using a five-point Likert scale (with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree): "do you agree that you should participate in housing management if your neighbors do the same", and "do you agree that participation in housing management is an obligation of every resident?" It is hypothesized that residents participate in housing management affairs more if they regard participation as a norm of fairness and Kantian norm.

To facilitate the interpretation of the results, all non-dichotomous measures, including the dependant variables, are linearly rescaled to the continuous [0,1] range before model estimation.

Data for analyses: source and descriptions

The data used for analyses come from a self-administered face-to-face structured questionnaire survey conducted in Hong Kong between May and August 2011. The questionnaire was designed to collect the information necessary for the empirical study. It was pretested and fine-tuned according to the testers’ feedbacks before the survey. Despite the higher costs incurred in the data collection process, the adoption of self-administered face-to-face interview using a preset questionnaire can maximize the number of respondents in the survey. Besides, the respondents are able to explain the terms or concepts embedded in the questionnaire in case when clarification is sought by the respondents. This entails more consistent understanding in the questions being asked among the respondents.

Urban areas of Shatin and Taipo, Hong Kong were chosen as the research areas. The two districts are essentially new towns development of which dated back to the 1970s. They were selected for two reasons. First, they had fairly normally-distributed population in terms of age, household income and education ⁸³. This helped reduce biases in the sample selection process. Second, as shown in the 2006 by-census, residents in these two districts had relatively high mobility ⁸⁴. Given that sense of community is likely contingent on residential stability, the selection of the two districts as study areas could facilitate sampling of respondents with different levels of sense of community.

A total of 64 private high-rise multi-owned residential developments in the two districts were randomly sampled. These developments had at least ten domestic stories, and ranged from standalone apartment buildings and composite developments with two to four residential towers resting on a retail podium to large-scale housing estates. Apart from the physical setting, the sampled developments varied in terms of age and management regimes, entailing a diversified sample for analysis. Figures 1 and 2 show two of the sampled developments. In these 64 residential developments, a total of 900 dwelling units were randomly sampled for the structured questionnaire survey. Upon three attempts to approach the residents in the selected units, 417 residents (46.3%) were successfully interviewed in the end.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the respondents’ demographic characteristics and the mean responses for the variables, respectively. Generally speaking, males dominated the survey, representing 71.5% of the respondents. The average education level of the respondents was high, with over 65% attaining matriculation or higher level. As one can see from Table 3, most of the variables have a mean between 0.4 and 0.6 after rescaling. The level of discontent, DISC, has the smallest standard deviation among all the variables. About 4% of the respondents reported themselves as a committee member of a resident association.

Results of explanatory analysis

The results of OLS analysis are summarized in Table 4. The adjusted R-squared is 0.57, which is comparable with the results of other empirical studies using the CIM. The analysis results confirm several important aspects of the CIM. All collective interest variables have a significant (at the 5% level) and positive correlation with residents’ participation level, indicating that discontent, expected reciprocity, perceived sense of community and personal influence enter into the decision calculus of an average resident. As for the impacts of demographic characteristics, gender, age and income have no correlation with participation level but better-educated residents are found to be more participative. On the other hand, all selective benefit variables are found to have significant (at least at 10% level) and positive relationship with participation level. Among all twelve independent variables, sense of community has the greatest value of estimated coefficient in absolute terms (0.2019), followed by committee membership (0.1864) and discontent level (0.1411).

Figure 1: New Town Plaza in Shatin.

Figure 2: Tai Po Centre in Taipo.

Table 2: Demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Note: * The percentages for each characteristic may not sum to unity because of rounding.

Table 3: Mean responses by the surveyed residents before and after rescaling

Discussion and implications of the research findings

Table 4 shows that income does not play a significant role in determining resident participation in the sample. This result is contradictory to other empirical evidence that participation in collective actions increases with the level of affluence ⁸⁵. One of the possible explanations of the deviation is that although high-incomers may have more resources for participating in collectivism, they bear higher opportunity cost of time. In this regard, the perceived benefits of participation may be upset by the perceived time cost, rendering participation an unfavorable choice for the affluent residents.

Table 4: Estimation results of the OLS analysis.

Concerning the collective interest variables, residents participate more actively when their dissatisfaction with housing management outcomes augments, holding other variables constant. This finding actually echoes with a previous study that residents in Hong Kong’s private housing generally take a reactive approach to housing management collectivism ⁸⁶. They tend to stay away from housing management affairs unless they can no longer endure the problems with their living environment. In other words, there must be a large gap between the expectation and actual condition of the residents such that the collective benefits of effective housing management are large enough to drive the residents to actively participate. Yet, regardless of the level of discontent, perceived self efficacy also matters in the participation decision. Even when the potential collective benefits of housing management are perceived positive, the residents may be reluctant to participate if they see themselves as incapable of changing the collective outcomes. As indicated by the estimated coefficients in Table 4, however, discontent level has a greater relative importance than self efficacy in predicting participation behaviour. That means a resident who perceives a relatively low level of self efficacy still tends to actively participate in housing management affairs if his dissatisfaction with the existing housing management outcomes is strong enough.

Meanwhile, the positive relationship between participation level and expected reciprocity suggests that residents who believe that their neighbors will reciprocate expect more benefits than costs from their own participation. Moreover, participation level increases with sense of community, indicating that residents who perceive stronger sense of community within their residential developments are more participative in housing management affairs. The analysis results suggest that the perceived collective efficacy of the ‘resident groups’ have an influential impact on individual residents’ decisions regarding housing management participation. They also confirm the findings of previous research that a group’s collective efficacy shapes individual members’ expectations and eventually determine their participation (and non-participation) ⁸⁷. In practice, resident participation is essential for housing management in many different aspects. For example, in order to form a resident association, terminate the service contract of an incompetent PMA or execute an improvement project for a building, the assent of the majority of the building co-owners is required to kick off the exercises.

According to the analysis results, self-perceived personal influence affects one’s decision to participate in housing management. The more efficacious an individual feels, the more likely he is an active participant in housing management. However, effort by an individual resident alone is generally not enough to substantiate collectivism so participation of other residents is thus perceived as an important consideration for one’s decision to participate. More importantly, if the residents are not united or do not form a cohesive unit, it is difficult for them to act collectively and work towards the same goal. Participation will be unlikely if a resident thinks that the group cannot work effectively to achieve better management for his MOH. This view is supported by the empirical evidence that the estimated coefficient of sense of community has the greatest value among all collective interest variables, as shown in Table 4. From above, it is crystal clear that apart from perceived self efficacy, participation calculus also depends very much on the individual’s perceptions of his neighbors. A resident will not be keen on participating in housing management if he regards other residents as free-riders. It is a matter of mutual trust among the residents. In one occasion, if the resident, but not his neighbors, participates, he will probably lose confidence in his neighbors’ future involvement in housing management affairs. Unless the overall value of the collective goods is huge enough to motivate his participation in MOH management, he has a high propensity to opt for non-participation in subsequent games.

Along this line of thought, a community-building approach, which is based upon the ideology of communitarianism, may be helpful in promoting resident participation in housing management affairs ⁸⁸. Different types of social activities (e.g., outings, spring feasts and Christmas parties) can be organized to harness the sense of community or neighborliness in MOH. To facilitate the integration of newcomers to an established residential community, welcoming parties or induction programs can also be organized for this group of people. All these activities can help the residents know their neighbors more and develop a common set of community value within their housing developments. While resources are needed for these community-building activities, the government may consider offering supports and subsidies, or even organizing the events proactively. In addition to community investment, the uses of some responsive and non-destructive approaches (e.g., mediation) in resolving neighbor disputes are possible alternatives. It is because many neighbor disputes in Hong Kong are not handled in a timely and amicable manner, eventually resulting in litigations which destroy resident relationship and undermine sense of community and mutual trust.

Apart from sense of community, social norms were also found to play significant roles in residents’ participation decision though their impacts were not as great as the collective interest variables from the empirical findings. Holding norms of responsibility and fairness is conducive to a higher level of participation in MOH management. If there is an intention to promote resident participation, these two types of social norms are worth developing among local residents. Yet, in residential developments where resident participation is rare, norms of responsibility are seemingly easier to develop than norms of fairness. It is because the latter entail norms of non-cooperation among residents if most of them stay away from contributing to the collective goods for MOH management. Reciprocal participation is envisaged only if participative residents are the majority. To build up everyday Kantianism, civic education should be promoted. Furthermore, local governments and academics may need to provide more information to or educate residents about the economic outcomes of good housing management. As inferred from the empirical findings, it is likely that residents are not willing to participate on account of their underestimation of the values of collective goods derived from proper housing management. Better management of housing can generate economic benefits for residents (e.g., higher property rental values and shorter downtime for services) and reduce economic losses associated with building problems (e.g., medical costs and huge damages payable to the victims of building-related accidents and property losses due to theft). Once the residents visualize the true values of housing management outcomes, they will be more motivated to devote their efforts to the management of their residential developments.

The motivations created by expressive incentives for an individual resident to participate in housing management affairs are evident from the analysis results. Participation is more frequent for residents with a strong attachment to their living places. In addition, membership in the committee of a resident association is a strong motivator of participation. At the same time, the empirical findings, to a certain extent, suggest that resident participation is norm-oriented in some way. Participation decisions in this study are found to be sensitive to beliefs in the norms of fairness and everyday Kantianism. In this sense, reciprocal tit-for-tat facilitates cooperation among residents of a building in repeated or iterated games of housing management. Besides, a more participative environment can be nurtured by developing norms of responsibility among residents.

Lastly, this study also evidences that apart from higher perceived value of the collective good to be produced and higher chances of success in providing the good, the expected value of participation also will be boosted with the increase in the selective benefits of participation. Institutional measures such as rewards and punishments can be implemented to alter selective benefits of participation. For example, residents can be encouraged to participate more in housing management with some rewards. Say, if honorariums are paid to the committee members of a resident association, their time costs can be covered or remunerated. Accordingly, more people are willing to engage in the management of their housing.

Nonetheless, this empirical study is not free of weakness. For instance, most of the variables in the exploratory model are not directly observable or measurable. Perceived value of collective good and sense of community, for example, are perceptions measurements of which had to be based on some operational indicators. As a result, the research quality depends very much the degree to which these indicators or measures that can truly reflect the perceptions. While content validity is important, the indicators, operationalized as questions in the questionnaire, cannot be too complicated. They have to be easily understandable by the average respondents so that the latter should have the same interpretation towards each interview question. A balance is thus to be struck between the two conflicting goals.

Conclusion

In MOH, the sharing or co-ownership arrangement of common facilities necessitates collectivism among residents in order to achieve effective housing management. Given the public-good nature of good housing management, residents tend to free-ride others’ efforts. Yet, not all MOH in Hong Kong are unmanaged. Then, this leads to the famous collective-action paradox: why do as many people participate in housing management as they do when, according to the assumption of individual rationality, they should not? Against this background, this study uses the CIM to investigate residents’ participation behavior in the management of high-rise multi-owned residential development in Hong Kong. The analysis results confirm the relevance of the CIM as an explanatory framework for resident participation in housing management. Residents who are dissatisfied with the housing management outcomes, believe they can make a difference in the collective outcomes, perceive high levels of sense of community and reciprocity among the co-owners, have a positive resident identity and are committee members of a resident association are more likely to be an active participant in housing management. More educated residents who may have better civic skills to absorb selective costs are more participative. Besides, resident participation in housing management is, to a certain extent, norm-oriented.

While the findings of this research paint a complex picture for policy-makers who desire to involve the residents in housing management, they do offer insights into the sustainable management of the housing stock in many different high-rise cities. In general, resident participation can be readily promoted by increasing the selective benefits of participation or collective interests. Besides, as the analysis results imply, collectivism in MOH management necessitates strong sense of community and reciprocity in the living place. As the CIM premises, an individual resident’s utility of participation will be near zero when he regards himself unable to affect the collective outcomes or he expects no effective cooperation among the residents even if the collective benefits of good housing management are high. Moreover, as long as the residents can tolerate the existing housing management outcomes, they continue to let others do the work for them. This free-riding dogma could lead to a deadlock in building care in a city. In this regard, the government should educate the residents about their roles in housing management.

Although difficult to quantify, the contribution of this study is significant. Apart from confirming the usefulness of the classical CIM in explaining the collectivism in the management of high-rise MOH, this study also attempts to enrich the model with constructs like sense of community and social norms. In fact, what makes cooperation among residents in MOH so difficult could be that MOH involves a sphere where "unchosen" others must interact and where the behavior of one party influences others⁸⁹. In this light, participation in housing management can be promoted by enhancing collective or group efficacy through the reinforcement of social bonding among residents. Once sense of community and mutual trust are fostered among residents in a residential development, it is more likely for them to hold very similar values about housing management. As a result, each of them will expect a greater degree of reciprocity from the other and a close working relationship will be built up to keep their building a pleasant place to live. Therefore, the development of long-term partnerships among residents is crucial for the promotion of resident participation in housing management. To this end, more supports or subsidies should be offered by the local governments, resident associations or other organizations to organize social gatherings and activities which can bring residents together. Moreover, mechanisms like mediation should also be put in place to resolve disputes or conflicts between residents in an amicable and non-destructive manner.

This empirical study serves as a good starting point for further research on resident participation in MOH management. This study is based on the work focusing on one high-rise city (i.e., Hong Kong) so the research findings may be sensitive to the changes in the cultural and institutional contexts. For example, even when the same language is used in Hong Kong, Taipei and Beijing, three high-rise cities in the Greater China, the social, economic and political systems pose an interesting contrast. The three cities are positioned differently in the continuum of market economies. Hong Kong is the freest, Shanghai is subject to the highest degree of control, and Taipei is situated somewhere in-between. Civil society is very active in both Hong Kong and Taipei, compared with Shanghai. Yet, individualism predominates in Hong Kong’s community while the communal spirit is much stronger in Shanghai and Taipei. Therefore, the degree of collectivism in MOH management and its determinant may vary across the cities. On the other hand, compared with most Asian counterparts, Latin American high-rise cities tend to be more ethnically diversified. The high diversity may mediate the relationship between sense of community and MOH management collectivism. In this regard, cross-cultural comparative studies should be warranted.

Notes

¹The work described in this article was fully supported by a grant from City University of Hong Kong (Project No. 7008073 http://roweb.cityu.edu.hk/2010-2011/project/7008073P.htm). An earlier version of the article was presented at the 6th Australasian Housing Researchers’ Conference in Adelaide in February 2012, and the author would like to thank the conference delegates for their valuable comments and suggestions for the development of this article.

³ Yau, 2010.

⁴ Yau y Ho, 2009.

⁵ Wilhelmsson, 2008.

⁶ Rauh, Chew y Garfinkel, 2002.

⁷ Reschovsky y Newman, 1991.

⁸ Yau, 2010.

⁹ Bailey y Robertson, 1997.

¹⁰ Lujanen, 2010.

¹¹ Leung, 2005.

¹² Monti, 1989.

¹³ Peterman, 1996.

¹⁴ Somerville y Steele 1995.

¹⁵ Bengtsson, 2001.

¹⁶ Adriaanse, 2011.

¹⁷ Chavis y Wandersman, 1990.

¹⁸ Bailey y Robertson, 1997.

¹⁹ Kajiura, 1994.

²⁰ Wang, 2010.

²¹ Yip, 2010.

²² Walters y Kent, 2000.

²³ Chamberlin, 1976.

²⁴ Kangwa y Olubodun, 2003.

²⁵ Oliver y Marwell, 1992.

²⁶ Homans, 1961.

²⁷ Olson, 1965.

²⁸ Brunner, 1998.

²⁹ Buchanan y Tullock, 1962.

³⁰ Olson, 1965.

³¹ Hovi y Foss, 1995.

³² Lai y Chan, 2004.

³³ Walters y Kent, 2000.

³⁴ Olson,1965.

³⁵ Bengtsson, 1998.

³⁶ Oliver, 1980.

³⁷ Lubell, 2002.

³⁸ Yau, 2011a.

³⁹ Elster, 1989.

⁴⁰ Ellickson, 2001.

⁴¹ Elster, 1989.

⁴² Knobe, 1990.

⁴³ Parsons, 1967.

⁴⁴ Bengtsson, 2001.

⁴⁵ Elster, 1989.

⁴⁶ Yau, 2011b.

⁴⁷ Chwe, 1999.

⁴⁸ Elster, 1978.

⁴⁹ Adriaanse, 2011.

⁵⁰ McMillan y Chavis, 1986, p. 29.

⁵¹ Ahlbrandt y Cunningham, 1979.

⁵² Long y Perkins, 2003.

⁵³ Chavis y Wandersman, 1990.

⁵⁴ Perkins, Florin, Rich, Wandersman y Chavis, 1990.

⁵⁵ Nield, 1990.

⁵⁶ Hastings, Wong y Walters, 2006.

⁵⁷ Loo, 1991.

⁵⁸ Lee, 2005.

⁵⁹ Yau, 2010a.

⁶⁰ Yau, 2010b.

⁶¹ Home Affairs Department, 2010.

⁶² Olson, 1965.

⁶³ Finkel, Muller y Opp, 1989.

⁶⁴ Lubell, Zahran y Vedlitz, 2007.

⁶⁵ Finkel y Muller, 1998.

⁶⁶ Ibíd.

⁶⁷ Finkel, Muller y Opp, 1989.

⁶⁸ Lubell, 2002.

⁶⁹ Lubell, Vedlitz, Zahran y Alston, 2006.

⁷⁰ Lubell, Zahran y Vedlitz, 2007.

⁷¹ Yau, 2011a.

⁷² Yau, 2011b.

⁷³ Lubell, Zahran y Vedlitz, 2007.

⁷⁴ Perkins, Florin, Rich, Wandersman, Chavis, 1990.

⁷⁵ Oliver y Marwell, 1992.

⁷⁶ Brady, Verba y Schlozman, 1995.

⁷⁷ HK$ 1 = US$ 0,1290.

⁷⁸ Hidalgo y Hernández, 2001.

⁷⁹ Massey, 1991.

⁸⁰ Brown, Perkins y Brown, 2003.

⁸¹ Dekker, 2007.

⁸² Tajfel y Turner, 1979.

⁸³ Census and Statistics Department, 2007.

⁸⁴ Ibíd.

⁸⁵ Liu, Wang, Shishime y Fujitsuka, 2010.

⁸⁶ Yau, 2010a.

⁸⁷ Weible, 2008.

⁸⁸ Yau, 2010b.

⁸⁹ Silverman y Barton, 1994.

Bibliography

ADRIAANSE, Carlinde. The importance of norms: behavioural game theory as a tool to understand neighbourhood events. [En línea]. Housing, Theory and Society. 28(1): 39-60, 2011. ISSN 1403-6096. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14036091003691019.

AHLBRANDT, Roger y CUNNINGHAM, James. A new policy for neighborhood preservation. New York, Praeger. 1979. 276 p. ISBN 027-59032-7-3.

BAILEY, Nick y ROBERTSON, Douglas. Management of flats in multiple ownership: learning from other countries. Bristol, Policy Press. 1997. 64 p. ISBN 186-13407-7-X.

BENGTSSON, Bo. Solving the tenants’ dilemma: collective action and norms of co-operation in housing. [En línea]. Housing, Theory and Society. 17(4): 175-187, 2001. ISSN 1403-6096. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/140360900300108618.

BRADY, Henry E; VERBA, Sidney y SCHLOZMAN, Kay L. Beyond SES: a resource of political participation. The American Political Science Review. 89(2): 271-294, 1995. ISSN 0003-0554.

BROWN, Barbara; PERKINS, Douglas D y BROWN, Graham. Place attachment in a revitalizing neighborhood: individual and block levels of analysis. [En línea]. Journal of Environmental Psychology. 23(3): 259-271, 2003. ISSN 0272-4944. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0272-4944(02)00117-2.

BRUNNER, Eric J. Free riders or easy riders? An examination of the voluntary provision of public radio. Public Choice. 97(4): 587-604, 1998. ISSN 0048-5829.

BUCHANAN, James M, Gordon TULLOCK. The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 1962. 361 p. ISBN 047-20610-0-3.

CENSUS and Statistics Department. Hong Kong 2006 population by-census: basic tables for district council districts. [En línea]. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department. 2007. Disponible en: http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp440.jsp?productCode=B1120038.

CHAMBERLIN, John R. A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collective action. [En línea]. Public Choice. 26(1): 59-74, 1976. ISSN 0048-5829. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01725793.

CHAVIS, David M y WANDERSMAN, Abraham. Sense of community in the urban environment: a catalyst for participation and community development. [En línea]. American Journal of Community Psychology. 18(1): 55-81, 1990. ISSN 0091-0562. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00922689.

CHWE, Michael S. Structure and strategy in collective action. The American Journal of Sociology. 105(1): 128-156, 1999. ISSN 0002-9602.

DEKKER, Karien. Social capital, neighbourhood attachment and participation in distressed urban areas: a case study in the Hague and Utrecht, the Netherlands. [En línea]. Housing Studies. 22(3): 355-379, 2007. ISSN 0267-3037. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02673030701254103.

ELLICKSON, Robert C. The market for social norms. American Law and Economics Review. 3(1): 1-49, 2001. ISSN 1465-7252.

ELSTER, Jon. Logic and society: contradictions and possible worlds. Chicherster, Wiley. 1978. 235 p. ISBN 047-19954-9-5.

ELSTER, Jon. The cement of society: a study of social order. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1989. 311 p. ISBN 052-13760-7-6.

FINKEL, Steven E. y MULLER, Edward N. Rational choice and the dynamics of political action: evaluating alternative models with panel data. The American Political Science Review. 92(1): 37-49, 1998. ISSN 0003-0554.

FINKEL, Steven E.; MULLER, Edward N. y OPP, Karl-Dieter. Personal influence, collective rationality, and rational choice, and democratic values in the former Soviet Union. The American Political Science Review. 83(3): 885-903, 1989. ISSN 0003-0554.

HASTINGS, Eileen M.; WONG, Siu K. y WALTERS, Megan. Governance in a co-ownership environment: the management of multiple-ownership property in Hong Kong. [En línea]. Property Management. 24(3): 293-308, 2006. ISSN 0263-7472. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02637470610660165.

HIDALGO, M Carmen y HERNÁNDEZ, Bernardo. Place attachment: conceptual and empirical questions. [En línea]. Journal of Environmental Psychology. 21(3): 273-281, 2001. ISSN 0272-4944. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jevp.2001.0221.

HOMANS, George. Social behaviour: its elementary forms. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1961. 416 p. ISBN 071-00341-0-5.

HOME Affairs Department. Putting in place a regulatory framework for property management industry: consultation paper. Hong Kong: Home Affairs Department. 2010.

HOVI, Jon y FOSS, Pal. The collective action problem and some of its solutions. En: FOSS, Pal. Economic approaches to organizations and institutions. Aldershot, Dartmouth. 1995. p. 241-256. ISBN 185-52166-7-1.

KAJIURA, Tsuneo. Condominium management in Japan. En: BARTON, Stephen E y SILVERMAN, Carol J. Common interest communities: private governments and the public interest. Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California. 1994. p. 247-274. ISBN 087-77235-9-1.

KANGWA, Joseph y OLUBODUN, Femi. An investigation into home owner maintenance awareness, management and skill-knowledge enhancing attributes. [En línea]. Structural Survey. 21(2): 70-78, 2003. ISSN 0263-080X. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02630800310479061.

KNOKE, David. Organizing for collective action: the political economics of associations. New York, Aldine de Gruyter. 1990. 258 p. ISBN 020-23041-2-0.

LAI, Lawrence Wai-Chung y CHAN, Pearl Yik-Long. The formation of owners’ corporations in Hong Kong’s private housing estates: a probit evaluation of Mancur Olson’s group theory. [En línea]. Property Management. 22(1): 55-68, 2004. ISSN 0263-7472. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02637470410525491.

LEUNG, Carolyn C. Resident participation: a community-building strategy in low-income neighborhoods. Cambridge, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2005. 32 p.

LI, Ling Hin. Managing community in Hong Kong – the political economy perspective. [En línea]. Property Management. 23(2): 122-136, 2005. ISSN 0263-7472. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02637470510589995.

LIU, Xianbing; WANG, Can; SHISHIME, Tomohiro y FUJITSUKA, Tetsuro. Environmental activisms of firm’s neighboring residents: an empirical study in China. [En línea]. Journal of Cleaner Production. 18(10/11): 1001-1008, 2010. ISSN 0959-6526. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2010.03.004.

LONG, D Adam y PERKINS, Douglas D. Confirmatory factor analysis of the sense of community index and development of a brief SCI. [En línea]. Journal of Community Psychology. 31(3): 279-296, 2003. ISSN 0091-0562. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jcop.10046.

LOO, K Francis. A guide to effective property management in Hong Kong. Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press. 1991. ISBN 962-20928-5-3.

LUBELL, Mark. Environmental activism as collective action. [En línea]. Environment and Behavior. 34(4): 431-454, 2002. ISSN 0013-9165. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00116502034004002.

LUBELL, Mark; VEDLITZ, Arnold; ZAHRAN,Sammy y ALSTON, Letitia T. Collective action, environmental activism, and air quality policy. [En línea]. Political Research Quarterly. 59(1): 149-160, 2006. ISSN 1065-9129. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900113.

LUBELL, Mark; ZAHRAN, Sammy y VEDLITZ, Arnold. Collective action and citizen responses to global warming. [En línea]. Political Behaviour. 29(3): 391-413, 2007. ISSN 0190-9320. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9025-2.

LUJANEN, Martti. Legal challenges in ensuring regular maintenance and repairs of common parts of owner-occupied apartment buildings. [En línea]. Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction. 2(1): 5-10, 2010. ISSN 1943-4162. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)1943-4162(2010)2:1(5).

MASSEY, Doreen. The political place of locality studies. [En línea]. Environment and Planning A. 23(2): 267-282, 1991. ISSN 0308-518X. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a230267.

MCMILLAN, David W. y CHAVIS, David M. Sense of community: a definition and theory. [En línea]. Journal of Community Psychology. 14(1): 6-23, 1986. ISSN 0091-0562. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6629(198601)14:1<6::AID-JCOP2290140103>3.0.CO;2-I.

MONTI, Daniel J. The organizational strengths and weaknesses of resident-managed public housing sites in the United States. [En línea]. Journal of Urban Affairs. 11(1): 39-52, 1989. ISSN 0735-2166. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.1989.tb00175.x.

NIELD, Sarah. Legal framework of deeds of mutual covenant. En: NIELD, Sarah y SIHOMBING, Judith. Multi-Storey building management. Hong Kong, Hong Kong Law Journal. 1990. p. 1-25.

OLIVER, Pamela y MARWELL, Gerald. Mobilizing technologies for collective action. En: MORRIS, Aldon D. y MUELLER, Carol M. Frontiers in social movement theory. New Naven, Yale University Press. 1992. p. 251-272. ISBN 030-00548-6-6.

OLIVER, Pamela. Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: theoretical investigations. The American Journal of Sociology. 85(6): 1356-1375, 1980. ISSN 0002-9602.

OLSON, Mancur. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1965. 186 p. ISBN 067-45375-1-3.

PARSONS, Talcott. The structure of social action. New York, Free Press. 1967. 470 p. ISBN 002-92424-0-1.

PERKINS, Douglas D.; FLORIN, Paul; RICH, Richard C.; WANDERSMAN, Abraham y CHAVIS, David M. Participation and the social and physical environment of residential blocks: crime and community context. [En línea]. American Journal of Community Psychology. 18(1): 83-115, 1990. ISSN 0091-0562. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00922690.

PETERMAN, William. The meanings of resident empowerment: why just about everybody thinks it’s a good idea and what has to do with resident management. [En línea]. Housing Policy Debate. 7(3): 473-490, 1996. ISSN 1051-1482. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10511482.1996.9521230.

RAUH, Virginia A.; CHEW, Ginger L. y GARFINKEL, Robin S. Deteriorated housing contributes to high cockroach allergen levels in inner-city households. Environmental Health Perspectives. 110 (Suppl 2): 323-327, 2002. ISSN 0091-6765.

RESCHOVSKY, James D. y NEWMAN, Sandra J. Home upkeep and housing quality of older homeowners. [En línea]. Journal of Gerontology. 46(5): 288-297, 1991. ISSN 1079-5006. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geronj/46.5.S288.

SOMERVILLE, Peter y STEELE, Andy. Making sense of tenant participation. [En línea]. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment. 10(3): 259-281, 1995. ISSN 1566-4910. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02496634.

TAJFEL, Henri y TURNER, John C. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. En: Austin, William G. y WORCHEL, Stephen. The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, Brooks-Cole. 1979. p. 187-204. ISBN 081-85027-8-9.

WALTERS, Megan y Paul KENT. Institutional economics and property strata title - a survey and case study. [En línea]. Journal of Property Research. 17(3): 221-240, 2000. ISSN 0959-9916. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09599910050119994.

WANG, Feng. Regulations and the imbalance of power relationships in newly developed residential neighbourhoods in urban China. En: BLANDY, Sarah; DUPUIS, Ann y DIXON, Jennifer. Multi-owned housing: law, power and practice. Farnham, Ashgate. 2010. p. 125-144. ISBN 075-46756-6-1.

WILHELMSSON, Mats. House price depreciation rates and level of maintenance. [En línea]. Journal of Housing Economics. 17(1): 88-101, 2008. ISSN 1051-1377. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2007.09.001.

YAU, Yung y HO, Daniel Chi Wing. The effects of building management practices on residential prices in Hong Kong. [En línea]. Journal of Building Appraisal. 4(3): 157-167, 2009. ISSN 1742-8262. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jba.2008.42.

YAU, Yung. Collectivism and activism in housing management in Hong Kong. [En línea]. Habitat International. 35(2): 327-334, 2011a. ISSN 0197-3975. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.11.006.

YAU, Yung. Engaging homeowners in building care in Hong Kong: drivers and barriers. [En línea]. Journal of Building Appraisal. 6(1): 35-48, 2010a. ISSN 1742-8262. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jba.2010.6.

YAU, Yung. Sense of community and homeowner participation in housing management: a study of Hong Kong. [En línea]. Urbani Izziv. 21(1): 126-135, 2010b. ISSN 0353-6483. Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.5379/urbani-izziv-en-2010-21-01-005.

YAU, Yung. Willingness to participate in collective action: the case of multi-owned housing management, working paper. Hong Kong, Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong. 2011b.

YIP, Ngai-ming. Management rights in multi-owned properties in Hong Kong. En: BLANDY, Sarah; DUPUIS, Ann y DIXON, Jennifer. Multi-owned housing: law, power and practice. Farnham: Ashgate. 2010. p. 109-124. ISBN 075-46756-6-1.

Received: 16.03.12

Accepted: 24.09.12